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SPECIAL PROJECT
INTEREST ON LAWYERS' TRUST
ACCOUNTS:
A PROPOSAL FOR WISCONSIN
In the course of their day-to-day practice attorneys are
routinely entrusted with clients' funds paid, for example, as
advances or retainers. This entrustment enables attorneys to
carry out their responsibilities and fulfil the expectations of
those retaining their services. Historically, these funds have
been comingled and placed in noninterest-bearing accounts
held in trust for the individual clients.1 In 1981, however,
the Supreme Court of Florida, based on the work of the
Florida Bar Association, implemented a program utilizing
the earning power of these aggregated trust funds.2 The
Florida court approved a plan allowing interest to accrue on
these otherwise idle funds and directed that money earned
from the investment program be used to finance predeter-
mined public service activities in the legal sector.3 Recently,
1. These trust accounts are mandated by the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1982). Specifically:
All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs
and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts
maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belong-
ing to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein ....
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(A) (1982).
2. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981). The interest on
trust account concept is relatively new to the United States but has existed for years in
foreign countries. At least 17 jurisdictions outside of this country have programs of
this nature: the Australian states of Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia,
Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory; the Canadian Provinces of Ontario,
Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island, Quebec and Saskatchewan; Namibia; the Republic of South Africa and
Zimbabwe. At least two more jurisdictions, England and Newfoundland, have pro-
posed its adoption. See Gonser, Almond & Ziegler, Financing Public ServiceActivities
with Interest-Bearing Attorney Trust Accounts, 15 IDAHO L. Rnv. 219, 221 & an. 6-7
(1979).
3. At least 11 states have approved this program in some form: CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44 (1982); Colo.
Sup. Ct. Order (Nov. 1, 1982); Fla. Sup. Ct. Order (May 25, 1981); Idaho Sup. Ct.
Order (May 27, 1982); Ill. Sup. Ct. Order (Mar. 4, 1983); Minn. Sup. Ct. Order (Dec.
27, 1982); Nev. Sup. Ct. Order (May 27, 1983); N.H. Sup. Ct. Order (Nov. 24, 1982);
Or. Sup. Ct. Order (Feb. 2, 1983); Va. Sup. Ct. Order (Mar. 10, 1983). But see Me.
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the State Bar of Wisconsin formed a committee which is
considering proposing a similar plan to the state supreme
court.
This article will examine the ramifications of the interest-
bearing trust account concept in Wisconsin and other states.
It will also analyze the constitutional implications arising
from the operation of such a program.
I. THE PROGRAM4
The viability of the interest on lawyers' trust accounts
(IOLTA) plan stems from the common practice of a client
leaving money in trust with his attorney. This practice often
facilitates the attorney's completion of a specifically deline-
ated transaction such as settlement of a personal injury
claim. Generally, the amount deposited in trust with the at-
torney is either kept for a short period of time or is too small
to be of significance. As a result of the administrative and
Sup. Ct. Order (Mar. 21, 1983) (declining to adopt the proposed interest on lawyers'
trust accounts plan).
4. The use of the word "program" or "plan" in this article refers to the general
concept of obtaining interest on commingled attorney trust funds as opposed to any
specific state plan. The Florida program is mentioned as a prototype since it
represents the first successful implementation of this concept in the country. See
England & Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 56 FLA. B.J. 101
(1982); Middlebrooks, The Interest on Trust Accounts Program, Mechanics of Its
Operation, 56 FLA. B.J. 115 (1982). But plans do vary. Some have been created by a
state supreme court rule while others have been enacted through legislation. See
generally supra note 3. Some require mandatory attorney participation while others
are voluntary in nature. Some set up an independent entity such as a "law
foundation" for receiving and distributing the funds while others run the program
through the state supreme court itself. There is more than one way to reach the single
desired goal. The best program for each individual state depends upon the makeup of
the state bar, the supreme court and the legislature in that state.
5. When a client places a large amount of money in trust, or the proposed hold-
ing period indicates that the accrued interest will exceed the administrative costs, then
the attorney has a responsibility to the client to invest the funds in a special individual
interest bearing account. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 348 (1982). For years attorneys have used their discretion in deciding
when an account of this kind is appropriate and very few problems have resulted.
See Kaap, Establishing and Maintaining a Client Trust Account, Wis. B. BULL., Nov.
1979, at 12. The program discussed in this article simply builds on this traditional
approach. The attorney makes the initial determination as to which kind of account
is appropriate, the only difference being that either selection would now produce in-
terest. No additional burdens are placed on the attorney. He could not be held liable
for making an improper choice to the client's detriment any more than he could be
held liable under the present system. The purpose of the trust account does not
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accounting costs incurred by the banking institutions and the
law firms, attorneys have been economically precluded from
depositing these amounts in separate interest bearing ac-
counts. 6 Moreover, the variability of client deposits in terms
of amount and duration makes it "exceedingly difficult, if
not impossible, to apportion the interest earned on a general
account among the respective clients whose funds from time
to time compose it."' 7  Standard nonincome-producing
checking accounts for holding and distributing client trust
funds are currently in general use throughout the country.8
The beneficiaries of the current system are the commercial
banks which hold these often substantial aggregated ac-
counts over long periods of time without having to make in-
terest payments.9
Recent developments in banking practices, however,
have opened an avenue which permits money placed in
these accounts to earn interest. By investing these previously
inactive funds in one of the new banking programs, such as a
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) checking account,
interest income can be earned.10 The client's deposit along
with other funds similarly situated would not be affected
since the money is still available upon demand. However,
the attorney's trust fund account would, for the first time,
change; it is only the collateral issue involving the determination of the beneficiary
that arises. See Gonser, Almond & Ziegler, supra note 2, at 221.
6. See Gonser, Almond & Ziegler, supra note 2, at 220.
7. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 801 n.18 (Fla. 1978).
8. See Gonser, Almond & Ziegler, supra note 2, at 220.
9. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. 1978).
10. NOW accounts can be opened if the "entire beneficial interest" accrued from
the accounts' operation "is held by one or more individuals or by an organization
which is operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable, educational, or
other similar purposes and which is not operated for profit." 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2)
(Supp. 1982). Thus, the NOW account works in this instance since the law founda-
tion, or other fund, into which the account interest is transferred is held by a nonprofit
organization. See Ronan & Lohmann, The Use of "NO W" Accountsfor Client Trust
Funds, Wis. B. BULL., July 1981, at 38.
A recent telephone survey of banks indicates that a money market account is, in
many situations, an attractive alternative to NOW accounts. Money market accounts
require a minimum balance of $2,500 to $5,000 but money in these accounts earns
interest at two to three percent higher than money in a NOW account. Telephone
interview with Carl Mattie, Personal Banking Officer, Marine National Exchange
Bank, Milwaukee, Wis. (Apr. 12, 1983).
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use the short-term deposits to fund legal public service pro-
grams which are becoming increasingly difficult to finance."
The theory behind this plan 12 is that, although there are
no major contributions, the sum of the smaller individual
deposits results in a consistently high NOW account balance.
This large balance produces substantial interest income.
The funds earned in the NOW account are then channeled
directly into a nonprofit organization or other approved as-
sociation. 13 This nonprofit law foundation or association 14
would then distribute the funds for certain limited uses de-
termined to be beneficial to the public as a whole, rather
than predominantly for the benefit of the legal profession. 5
11. The American Bar Association has concluded that IOLTA programs do not
violate an attorney's ethical responsibilities to his client. This opinion is grounded on
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1980) which em-
phasizes safekeeping. The committee asserts that the provision does not specifically
prohibit investment of this type as long as the money is available for the client's use
upon demand. For a complete discussion resolving the ethical considerations of this
program, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Ethics
Op. 348 (1982).
12. For a general outline of a model plan, see In re Interest on Trust Accounts,
356 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. 1978).
13. For the lawyer, the process operates as follows: initially, the firm shifts its
current trust fund from a standard checking account to a NOW account. See supra
note 10. At this point interest begins accruing on the commingled funds in the ac-
count. The earned income is transferred automatically by the local bank to the law
foundation's central account. By channeling it straight into a nonprofit organization,
accounting and administrative costs are eliminated for the law firm and are substan-
tially reduced for the banking institution.
After the money is transferred it continues to earn interest at the central location
(not necessarily by the use of a NOW account) until it is distributed to the specifically
approved legal public service programs. -See infra note 15. For the individual law
firm the only change is in the type of checking account used at the local bank. No
additional responsibilities are imposed.
14. The State Bar committee is working under the assumption that the program
in Wisconsin would be authorized by the state supreme court as opposed to being
enacted by legislation. A nonprofit law foundation would be created by the court to
implement the program and then to supervise its ongoing operation. The source of
the court's ability to authorize such a plan arises from the "inherent power" given the
judiciary in the constitutional separation of powers principle. See generally State v.
Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603 (1928); Comment, Inherent Power andAdminis-
trative Court Reform, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 133 (1975). Courts traditionally have been
viewed as having power within themselves to guard their independence from both the
executive and legislative branches. This "balance of power" protects the judicial sys-
tem from outside control and insures its continued vitality in resolving matters affect-
ing the administration ofjustice. Id. at 149. See generally Shavie v. State, 49 Wis. 2d
379, 182 N.W.2d 505 (1971); State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Ct., II Wis. 2d 560, 105
N.W.2d 876 (1960); In re Janitor of Sup. Ct., 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
15. Early commentators foresaw tax problems for such a scheme. See generally
[Vol. 66:835
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In Wisconsin the State Bar committee studying this mat-
ter is proceeding with plans to propose a program similar to
the Florida plan. Because of Wisconsin's integrated bar, the
State Bar's program would differ from Florida's in that, in
Wisconsin, attorney participation would be mandatory.1 6
However, recent actions of the Kenosha, Wisconsin, First
Bank Southeast, N.A., present the committee with a unique
situation. In November, 1982, the bank became the first in-
stitution in this country to offer interest on individual trust
funds regardless of the amount of money or the period of
time involved.1 7  It will also prepare separate records for
each client and issue statements for tax purposes. However,
Comment, A Source of Revenuefor the Improvement ofLegal Services, Part 11- A
Recommendationfor the Use of Clients' Funds Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bear-
ing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of the Texas Bar Association and an Analysis
ofthe FederalIncome Tax Ramffcations, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113 (1979). But in 1981
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) removed a major impediment to instituting the
IOLTA programs by its favorable tax decision in Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16.
The IRS concluded that the income generated by the fund did not have to be matched
arid taxed as income to the individual client. Specifically, the ruling held: "[i]nterest
earned on clients' nominal and short-term advances [deposited in an attorney's trust
account] and paid over to the bar foundation... is not includible in the gross in-
comes of the clients." Id. This ruling is largely based on the fact that the income
cannot be controlied or used by the client.
The IRS later dictated that any one of four charitable uses would qualify the
funds for the above-mentioned tax treatment. The approved projects are: "(1) to
provide legal aid to the poor;, (2) to provide student loans; (3) to improve the adminis-
tration ofjustice; and (4) for such other programs for the benefit of the public as are
specifically approved from time to time.. . ..." Barker, Dispersing the Revenue: Pres-
ent Options and Needs, 56 FLA. B.J. 122, 122-23 (1982). These four purposes should
be strictly followed to ensure smooth passage of an IOLTA program. See also I.R.S.
Private Letter Ruling 8314065 (Jan. 6, 1983).
The Wisconsin Department of Revenue has indicated that it will follow the fed-
eral Revenue Ruling with respect to individuals, estates and trusts. "The ruling
would not apply to Wisconsin corporate clients, since the Wisconsin net income (or
loss) of corporations is not computed under the federal Internal Revenue Code." Let-
ter from Kurt J. Kasper, Director of Technical Services, State of Wisconsin, Depart-
ment of Revenue, to the Marquette Law Review (Apr. 19, 1983).
16. The term "integrated bar" refers to the situation in Wisconsin where every
attorney is required to be a member of the State Bar of Wisconsin as a condition
precedent to the right to practice law in the state. Its purpose is to unify the profes-
sion so that programs which aid in the efficient administration of justice, such as the
one discussed here, can be implemented by the group as a whole rather than by fac-
tions of the profession. See Wis. STAT. § 758.25 (1981-1982); Wis. Sup. Ct. Rule
10.01 (1982).
17. Clearly most banks have the technology available to do this, but since there is
no service charge, they must do so at a loss. Whether the Kenosha bank offers this
service as a loss leader or as a promotional tool is uncertain.
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the bank provides this service only for those firms having a
regular checking account with it. This condition effectively
limits the program to lawyers practicing in the Kenosha
area. As such, any mandatory program should provide an
escape clause to enable Kenosha area attorneys to take ad-
vantage of the bank's service in order to serve the best inter-
est of their clients. Thus, in Wisconsin the program would
be required for all attorneys outside the Kenosha area or any
other area in which a financial institution offered a similar
service.
This escape provision is not without precedent. The
Minnesota plan is mandatory but provides for just such a
contingency.' 8 It allows attorneys to use an available service
such as that offered by First Bank Southeast, N.A.. Wiscon-
sin is not precluded from setting up a plan in this state sim-
ply because one bank has an alternative program. A
mandatory or at the very least a voluntary program modeled
18. MINNESOTA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-103
(1982) provides:
INTEREST BEARING TRUST ACCOUNTS
(A) Each trust account referred to in DR 9-102 shall be in interest bearing
trust account in a bank, savings bank, trust company, savings and loan associa-
tion, savings association, credit union or federally regulated investment com-
pany selected by a lawyer in the exercise of ordinary prudence.
(B) A lawyer who receives client funds shall maintain a pooled interest bear-
ing trust account for deposit of client funds that are nominal in amount or
expected to be held for a short period of time. The interest accruing on this
account, net of any transactions costs, shall be paid to the Lawyer Trust Ac-
count Board established by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
(C) All client funds shall be deposited in the account specified in subdivision
(B) unless they are deposited in:
(1) A separate interest bearing trust account for the particular client or
client's matter on which the interest, net of any transaction costs, will be
paid to the client; or,
(2) A pooled interest bearing trust account with subaccounting which will
provide for computation of interest earned by each client's funds and the
payment thereof, net any transaction costs, to the client.
(D) In determining whether to use the account specified in subdivision (B) or
an account specified in subdivision (C), a lawyer shall take into consideration
the following factors:
(1) The amount of interest which the funds would earn during the period
they are expected to be deposited;
(2) The cost of establishing and administering the account, including the
cost of the lawyer's services; and
(3) The capability of financial institutions described in subdivision (A) to
calculate and pay interest to individual clients.
[Vol. 66:835
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after the Florida plan outlined in this article can still be set
up in Wisconsin.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN IMPLEMENTING
THE PROGRAM
The major constitutional problem that has been raised
against the IOLTA concept is that the diversion of account
interest into a nonprofit law foundation violates the "taking"
clause of the fifth amendment. 19 Parties opposing these
plans assert that the money earned in the account more
properly belongs to the clients whose funds make up the
principal upon which the interest is earned.20 These oppo-
nents argue that, since the individual clients are not compen-
sated for this improper taking, the plan itself is
constitutionally defective and therefore cannot be
implemented.2'
The taking clause provides: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 22 The
interpretation of this seemingly straightforward directive has
been litigated numerous times.23 The United States
Supreme Court has admitted its own difficulty in coming to
terms with the fifth amendment's command by remarking
that "[t]he question of what constitutes a 'taking' for pur-
poses of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem
of considerable difficulty. 24 The Supreme Court has had no
problem identifying the purpose of the taking provision, not-ing that it is "designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
19. For a thorough discussion of this argument, see generally Baker & Wood,
"Taking" a Constitutional Look at the State Bar of Texas Proposal to Collect Interest
on Attorney-Client Trust Accounts, 14 TEx. TECH L. Rav. 327 (1983); Comment, A
Source of Revenuefor the Improvement ofLegal Services, Part P: An Analysis ofthe
Plans in Foreign Countries and Florida Allowing the Use of Clients' Funds Held by
Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bearing Accounts to Support Programs ofthe Organized Bar,
10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539, 556-60 (1979).
20. See supra note 19.
21. Id.
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
23. The earliest reported case to deal with the taking issue was Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (seriatim opinion). See also Baker & Wood, supra note
19, at 355, and cases cited therein.
24. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
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ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. '25
The Court's view of the purpose of the taking clause, how-
ever, has not assisted them in formulating consistent deci-
sions. The Court has not developed any set forumula to
determine where regulation ends and taking begins 26 and in-
stead has looked to the individual circumstances of each
case.
27
A. The Historical Background of Taking Clause Decisions
Past Supreme Court decisions interpreting the taking
clause fail to provide present courts with concrete guide-
lines.28 The 1922 Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon 29 is the definitive holding for analyzing
the application of the taking clause. Pennsylvania Coal rep-
resents the Court's adoption of a balancing approach taking
into account both the public benefit and the individual loss
given the facts of each case.3° In Pennsylvania Coal Justice
Holmes set forth as a "general rule. . . that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."' 3I He went on to state
that this becomes a "question of degree - and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions. 32
Justice Holmes's emphasis on the degree of the actual
taking replaced, but did not overrule, the previous mode of
25. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
26. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
27. Id. at 124 (citing United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,
168 (1958)) (citations omitted).
28. This article does not purport to be an historical analysis of the taking clause
provision. For greater detail, see generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1977); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 440-47 (1978); Baker & Wood, supra note 19; Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Com-
pensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J.
149 (1971); Note, Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58
TEx. L. REv. 1447 (1980).
29. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal the Court invalidated Penn-
sylvania's Kohler Act, which had prohibited coal mining that caused damage to struc-
tures used for human habitation. The Court found the Act unconstitutional in that it
had the effect of destroying company property without compensation.
30. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 440-41; Note,
supra note 28, at 1452, 1457.
31. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
32. Id. at 416.
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analysis in taking clause cases. That view, endorsed by Jus-
tice Harlan in the 1887 decision of Mugler v. Kansas,33 was
more literal in its reading of the taking provision. To consti-
tute a taking, Mugler required an actual physical appropria-
tion of private property without compensation.34 The
problem that has arisen is that instead of developing a "sin-
gle framework to define a taking, the Supreme Court...
has retained to some extent the theories of both Justice
Holmes and Justice Harlan. '35 The result is that while Penn-
sylvania Coal is the rule, the Supreme Court may also bor-
row from Mugler when analyzing a "taking" problem.36
In reviewing the applicability of the taking clause to a
given situation two separate issues must be resolved. Ini-
tially, it must be determined that a valid property interest is
the subject of the constitutional attack. 7 Secondly, upon a
finding that an individual has established a legitimate own-
ership claim, it must be determined that his interest has been
taken without compensation.38 Only when both are found
does the proceeding violate the fifth amendment taking
clause.
B. What Is Property?
The first criterion which must be met before a taking
clause argument can be successfully maintained is a determi-
nation that the claimant has a vested property interest in
what is being confiscated. 39 The inquiry into "what is prop-
erty," however, has produced answers which are "notori-
ously, even maddeningly, vague."'' The most widely
33. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
34. Id. at 667-69. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 28, at
441-42.
35. . NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNG, supra note 28, at 442. See generally
Note, supra note 28, at 1454-55.
36. Given this dichotomy one decision has held that in the end, the "[r]esolution
of each case ... ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the
application of logic." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
37. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 490.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Gov-
ernment Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 207, 241.
1983]
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accepted definition of the property concept was expressed by
the Supreme Court in the 1972 decision of Board of Regents
v. Roth. 4' In that decision the Court explained that: "[t]o
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, in-
stead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."42 After
Roth, disputes involving the resolution of property owner-
ship have centered on the concept of "entitlement." 43 If an
individual can show entitlement to the benefits of the prop-
erty seized, he will be deemed the owner of the property and
entitled to compensation for the taking.44
C Has There Been a Taking?
Upon a finding that there is a valid property interest
present, the next determination is whether an unconstitu-
tional taking has occurred. In considering this the Supreme
Court has focused on guidelines not necessarily reflective of
the Holmes or Harlan views. These more recent guidelines
were set forth by the Supreme Court in 1978 in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City. 4 5 Initially the Court
examined "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations
.... "46 Moreover, the "character" of the action taken by
the government is crucial.47 The Court will more often find
a taking "when the interference with property can be charac-
terized as a physical invasion by government . . . [rather]
than when interference arises from some public program ad-
justing the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good.""8
Penn Central is an example of a case in which the guide-
lines of Pennsylvania Coal could have been used to disarm a
41. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
42. Id. at 577.
43. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 491.
44. Id.
45. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
46. Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
47. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
[Vol. 66:835
LAWYERS' TRUST ACCOUNTS
statute. In Penn Central the application of New York City's
Landmark Preservation Law49 effectively precluded the con-
struction of a huge multi-story office building over Penn
Central Transportation Company's Grand Central Station.
Because the building had been designated an historic
landmark, any alteration in the physical appearance of the
building, whether exterior architectural changes or construc-
tion of improvements on the site, needed advance approval
from city officials.50 When the planned addition was denied,
Penn Central brought suit alleging a taking without
compensation.
In ruling against Penn Central, the Supreme Court ad-
mitted that the statute imposed some inherent burdens on
property owners and remarked that "designation as a
landmark results in restrictions upon the property owner's
options concerning use of the landmark site." 51 However, in
its final analysis the Court focused both on "the character of
the action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole . -"2 The Court con-
cluded that the statute did not interfere with the present use
of the terminal and therefore the company could realize a
reasonable return on its investment.5 3  Moreover, even
though the law had eliminated building onto Grand Central
Station, Penn Central could still have used one of its alter-
nate sites for the proposed office building.54
One year later in Andrus v. Allard,5 5 the Court again fo-
cused on the plaintiffs rights as a whole rather than looking
at the isolated effect of a statute. In Andrus the Court ex-
amined Eagle Protection Act regulations 6 and Migratory
Bird Treaty Act regulations57 and determined that both of
these environmental measures were constitutionally valid. 8
49. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976).
50. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 112.
51. Id. at 111.
52. Id. at 130-31.
53. Id. at 136.
54. Penn Central owned several other buildings in the immediate vicinity at least
two of which were suitable for the project in the eyes of the court. Id. at 137.
55. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
56. 50 C.F.R. § 22.2(a) (1978).
57. Id. § 21.2(a).
58. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 55.
1983]
MARQ UETE LAW REVIEW
These Acts are conservation statutes designed to protect cer-
tain species of birds and to prohibit the sale or possession of
such birds or their parts.59 The plaintiffs in the action sold
Indian artifacts, many of which contained feathers from the
protected birds.60 The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes un-
constitutionally deprived them of their livelihood in that the
feathers in the artifacts were taken from birds killed before
the protective safeguards went into effect.6 1
The Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs, stating
that:
The regulations challenged here do not compel the sur-
render of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or
restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has
been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts.
But the denial of one traditional property right does not
always amount to a taking. At least where an owner pos-
sesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction of
one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the ag-
gregate must be viewed in its entirety.62
The Court noted that the most profitable way of disposing of
the artifacts was prohibited but that the plaintiff's right to
possess, transport, donate or devise the items remained
unaffected.63
One comment made in Andrus perhaps best illustrates
the Court's position in reviewing taking clause proceedings.
It remarked that all "government regulation - by definition
- involves the adjustment of rights for the public good."'
The Court also said that: "Often this adjustment curtails
some potential for the use or economic exploitation of pri-
vate property. 65 Since the government cannot compensate
those adversely affected each time it creates a statute, the
Court then necessarily concluded that the "Taking Clause
...preserves governmental power to regulate, subject only
to the dictates of 'justice and fairness.' ",66
59. Id. at 52-54.
60. Id. at 54.
61. Id. at 54-55.
62. Id. at 65-66.
63. Id. at 66.
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
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In analyzing the above cases, other Supreme Court deci-
sions and legal commentary in this field, Professor
Michelman of Harvard Law School has developed a set of
four factors for use in determining whether compensation is
required in a taking.67 They are:
(1) whether the public or its agents have physically used
or occupied something belonging to the claimant;
(2) the size of the harm sustained by the claimant or the
degree to which his affected property has been
devalued;
(3) whether the claimant's loss is outweighed by the pub-
lic's concomitant gain;
(4) whether the claimant has sustained any loss apart
from restriction of his liberty to conduct some activity
considered harmful to the other people.68
He states that, although none of these criteria alone estab-
lishes a sound rule of decision, they are guidelines by which
disputes of this nature are resolved. 9
D. Application of the Taking Clause to the Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Accounts
In light of the previous Supreme Court interpretations of
both the concept of property and the unconstitutional taking
of valid property interests, it is unlikely that the Court would
find the proposed Wisconsin IOLTA program violative of
the fifth amendment taking clause.70  The funds placed in
67. Michelman, supra note 28, at 1183-84.
68. Id. at 1184.
69. Id. In their analysis of a "taking" question a number of courts have applied
one or more prongs of the Michelman test. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982) (emphasizing the role of a "physical inva-
sion"); Lehigh & New England Ry. Co. v. I.C.C., 540 F.2d 71, 84 (1976)
(government's physical occupation of the claimant's property is often determinative);
State Dep't of Ecology v. Pacesetter Const., 89 Wash. 2d 203, _., 571 P.2d 196, 198-99
(1977) (balancing private loss against public gain).
70. Some commentators have suggested that the entire constitutional problem
could be avoided by obtaining the client's consent to use his funds in this program.
This could be implemented through the use of a notice-giving consent form. See
Comment, supra note 15, at 129-31. The Florida plan originally had such a notice
requirement. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 807 (Fla. 1978). How-
ever, this provision was later dropped from the program. In re Interest on Trust Ac-
counts, 402 So. 2d 389, 396 (Fla. 1981). This was done in light of the problenis that
would have arisen regarding the contents of the form and the time and expense in-
volved. Moreover, it would return to the client an element of control over the funds
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individual lawyers' trust accounts are usually so small and
are on deposit for so short a time that the administrative
costs involved in computing the individual interest due each
client would result in a net loss to the client. If these depos-
its were aggregated in one account set up under an IOLTA
plan, each client's contribution of interest earned would be
so minimal that the common law maxim Zex non curat de
minimus71 would be applicable. Moreover, clients in the
past have never had any expectation of receiving interest on
the funds they entrust to their attorneys. Thus, the program
does not collide with the "interest that [is] sufficiently bound
up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to con-
stitute 'property' for fifth amendment purposes" 72 and result
in a taking without compensation.
Despite these arguments, opponents equate the plan with
the statute struck down in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.
v. Beckwith .7 Webb's dealt with a Florida statute which al-
lowed individual counties to appropriate the interest accrued
on litigants' deposits held in a court interpleader fund. In
addition to this appropriation, a separate fee was charged to
the litigant for the clerk's handling costs. 74 In Webb's the
which would bring back the tax problems that originally troubled these programs.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
71. "The law does not concern itself with trifles." For an excellent discussion of
the constitutional elements of this topic, see Baker & Wood, supra note 19, at 358.
The authors discuss the de minimus concept at length labelling it the "best argument"
available for proponents of these plans. Id. at 358-61. The authors note that "[tlhe
[de minimus] argument would suggest that finespun theories of property become gos-
samer at some point .... [and that] [s]ome commentators have suggested that there
is a fourteenth amendment plimsoll line of property below which the Constitution has
no application." Id. at 360 (citations omitted). This is precisely the notion meant to
be conveyed by supporters of IOLTA programs.
72. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
73. 449 U.S. 155 (1980). A more recent Supreme Court case striking down a
statute as violative of the fifth amendment taking clause is Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982). Loretto is distinguishable from the
issue at hand because Loretto involved a complete loss of ownership rights. However,
compared to the taking in Penn Central, the taking in Loretto was quite minor, in-
volving as it did the placement of cable television wire on a rental building which the
Court characterized as a tangible physical intrusion. One commentator suggests that
Loretto signals a shift in the Court's willingness to accept takings for the public good.
Lauter, Payingfor Legal Aid by IOTAs, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 4, 1983, at 1, 22, col. 4
(IOLTA programs are alternatively referred to as Interest on Trust Accounts (IOTA)
plans).
74. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 157.
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interest earned on the single account was over $100,000. The
Court concluded that the enforcement of the statute consti-
tuted an improper taking in that the regulation did not ad-
just "the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good." 75 The Court found the initial fee ade-
quate to cover the costs invoked and stated that the interest
on the interpleader account was privately owned and not the
court's to keep.76
Wisconsin's proposed IOLTA program would not run
into the problems found in Webb's since the facts involved
in each are clearly distinguishable. The litigant in Webb's
lost more than $100,000 as a result of the court appropriation
of the interest earned in the interpleader account. The trust
fund program, on the other hand, deals with nominal sums
or short term deposits upon which an insignificant amount
of interest is generated. As previously stated, so little is ac-
cumulated that it would not cover the costs incurred by law
firms if they tried to pay the interest to the client.77 In short,
the program puts an otherwise idle sum of money to produc-
tive use generating interest which need not be designated as
the property of any particular client.78
Also important is the Supreme Court's balancing pro-
cess.79 In "taking" matters the purpose of the balancing pro-
75. Id. at 163 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
76. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 163-64.
77. This does not refer to localities like Kenosha, Wisconsin, which will have
banking facilities available to calculate the interest at no cost to the firm. When this
opportunity becomes available it is assumed that attorneys will use it because it will
better serve their clients. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
78. This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court of Florida's conclusion in
In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981). There the court stated:
With respect to constitutional concerns regarding the program, we see none
that bars implementation. There are many distinguishing features between the
program today implemented for the generation of interest on lawyers' trust
accounts, and the legal requirements of state law which led the United States
Supreme Court to invoke the fifth amendment "taking" clause for the protec-
tion of private property in its Webb's decision. The most relevant distinction,
plainly, is the fact that no client is compelled to part with "property" by reason
of a state directive, since the program creates income where there had been
none before, and the income thus created would never benefit the client under
any set of circumstances.
Id. at 395.
79. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
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cess is to determine whether the "public action is justified as
promoting the general welfare" of state citizens despite the
possibility of denying a "property owner of some beneficial
use of his property or . . .restrict[ing] the owner's' full ex-
ploitation of the property."' 0 The IOLTA program is for the
benefit of the public in that, unlike the situation in Webbs's,8'
the proposed trust fund plan is closely connected to proper
state concerns. One important objective of the legal profes-
sion is to give the poor competent representation and thus to
further the goal of keeping the courts accessible to all. The
Wisconsin IOLTA program would fund legal aid for the im-
poverished, while at the same time reducing the need for the
state's contribution through tax dollars. Given these consid-
erations, the program justifies itself by advancing legitimate
state interests while causing minimal individual loss.8
2
In addition, an application of Professor Michelman's fac-
tors for determining whether compensation is necessary for a
taking illustrates the feasibility of the proposed Wisconsin
IOLTA program. 3 First, no funds that now accrue to the
client would be used. A client cannot now obtain interest on
small amounts of principal kept in trust with his attorney. It
is solely the aggregation of his individual deposit with others
like it that creates interest and as such does not entitle the
client to any payment. Second, because principal is not
eroded under this program, the client would sustain no loss.
The client would retain every right to the use of his money
that he held before enactment of the program. Third, the
public would benefit in that money generated within the le-
gal system instead of through citizen tax dollars would be
used to fund legal public service programs.
Although the IOLTA program raises a number of consti-
tutional issues,8 4 authority does exist for its support. The
& J. YoUNG, Sufpra note 28, at 440-41. See also Note, supra note 28, at 1452, 1457,
1468.
80. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 163.
81. The Court in Webb's concluded that the statute involved was in no conceiva-
ble manner beneficial to the public. Id. at 164-65.
82. In addition, public policy favors placing assets into productive use. See, e.g.,
Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 11-16, 79 N.W. 738, 739-41 (1899).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69. The fourth factor is not applicable
in this situation.
84. See supra Part II.
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Supreme Court has seldom looked with favor on claims of
loss of projected future gains as a reason for invoking taking
clause restraints.8 5 Indeed, the Court has commented that
"because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated
gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than
other property-related interests. ' 86  This consideration
viewed in conjunction with cases in which significant losses
have been held not to constitute a taking8 7 supports a conclu-
sion that the interest on lawyers' trust accounts program
would be constitutional. 88
III. CONCLUSION
With few exceptions attorneys have soundly exercised
their discretion in determining whether funds deposited with
them constitute such a significant amount that an interest-
bearing account is required. The program proposed in this
article and pioneered by the Florida Bar Association does
nothing to change such discretion. The trust fund program
seeks to put nominal or short-term funds held by the lawyer
for his client to a more efficient use. Putting these aggre-
gated funds in an interest producing account would benefit
society and the whole legal system in Wisconsin. The pro-
gram could be instituted at no cost to the public, at no real
loss to any individual client and within the constitutional
mandates of the fifth amendment taking clause.
MARK F. WOLFE
85. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
86. Id.
87. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% loss of property value held not to be a taking); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (over 90% loss of property value held not to be a
taking).
88. Additionally, attorney participation in this program would be in keeping with
the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 8 (1980) which
states that a "lawyer should assist in improving the legal system."
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